
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments,
Exit to Work, and Job Quality
IZA DP No. 4325
July 2009
Gerard J. van den Berg
Johan Vikström 
Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, 
Punishments, Exit to Work, 
and Job Quality 
 
 
Gerard J. van den Berg 
VU University Amsterdam, IFAU Uppsala, 
CEPR, IFS and IZA  
 
Johan Vikström 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive 
sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the 
ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a 
sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 
1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use 
weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact the data register is 
large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search 
model with monitoring of job offer rejection vis-a-vis monitoring of job search effort. The 
observation window includes a policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. 
We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are on average lower after a sanction, 
and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital 
losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort. 
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Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems typically include monitoring of unem-
ployed workers and punitive sanctions for those who do not comply with job
search requirements (see e.g. OECD, 2000, for an overview). Van den Berg, Van
der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) is the ¯rst published study of the causal e®ect
of a punitive sanction on the transition rate from unemployment to employment.
Since then, a range of similar studies has been carried out for di®erent coun-
tries and time periods. See Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2005, 2006), for
overviews. These studies do not consider the e®ect of a sanction on the type of
job accepted. From a welfare point of view as well from the point of view of
the unemployed individual, such e®ects are important. If the job accepted after
a sanction is similar to the job accepted in the counterfactual situation of no
sanction, then severe sanctions and intensive monitoring have less adverse long-
run e®ects than if the former job is often worse than the latter. This relates to
the more general issue of how steeply bene¯ts should decline as a function of
the elapsed unemployment duration, to balance moral hazard with the likelihood
that unemployed individuals are driven into sub-optimal job matches (see e.g.
Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000).
In this paper we address the e®ects of sanctions on the quality of the job
that is accepted. We distinguish between e®ects on the wage and on working
hours (speci¯cally, full-time versus part-time). Wages and hours are potentially
relevant margins along which unemployed individuals make job acceptance deci-
sions. We use register data covering the full Swedish population over 1999{2004.
This includes several hundreds of thousands of unemployment spells. The register
data also include information on a large range of background characteristics of
the individual, his/her household, and his/her local labor market conditions. If
a spell is observed to end in a transition to work then in many cases we observe
the above-mentioned job characteristics. Notice that observation of a wage rate
is very unusual in register data on employment or, indeed, in annual longitudi-
nal panel survey data. Such data typically only record annual income or annual
earnings, which are composite measures based on both wages and hours worked.
Our data enable us to distinguish between e®ects on wages and e®ects on hours.
One may argue that any e®ects on characteristics of the ¯rst accepted job
after unemployment may fade away swiftly as individuals have the opportunity
to search on the job and make transitions to jobs with better characteristics. We
investigate this by examining the job conditions that prevail several years after
the sanction. Moreover, we examine whether individuals make job acceptance
1decisions after a sanction that are more or less irreversible. Speci¯cally, we observe
the occupation of the accepted job, and we observe to what extent this di®ers
from the occupation of the pre-unemployment job. On average, acceptance of a
job with a lower occupational level involves a larger loss of human capital than
acceptance of a job in the same occupation. This loss becomes irreversible as
human capital depreciates over time. It may therefore be more di±cult for the
individual to move out of a bad job match if the job has a lower occupational
level. This makes it important to know whether sanctions often lead to a match
in a lower occupational level. By measuring the required number of years of
education for each occupation, we can quantify the human capital loss due to
the occupational downgrading caused by a sanction. Because of the existence of
separate educational tracks, this is likely to be a lower bound of the true loss.
The empirical analyses are based on the \timing of events" approach (see
e.g. Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003). This involves the estimation of duration
models for the duration to job exit and the duration until treatment (i.e., a sanc-
tion), exploiting random variation in the timing of the treatment and taking into
account that treatment assignment may be selective in that the durations may
be a®ected by related unobserved determinants. This is the standard approach in
the literature on sanction e®ects. Indeed, one may claim that punitive treatments
provide a best case application for this approach. This is, ¯rst of all, because the
moment at which an individual is caught is by de¯nition unanticipated by the
individual, so that the \no anticipation" assumption on the joint distribution
of counterfactuals is satis¯ed. Accordingly, the time until treatment. is to some
extent driven by an element that is random from the individual's point of view.
Secondly, unconfoundedness assumptions are almost by de¯nition likely to be in-
valid, because individuals can only logically display inadmissible behavior if this
behavior or its determinants are not fully observable in standard registers. To ad-
dress e®ects of dynamically assigned treatments on post-duration outcomes, like
post-unemployment wages, it becomes a necessity to deal with dynamic selection
due to unobserved heterogeneity even if the assignment process is randomized
(see Ham and LaLonde, 1996, and Abbring and Van den Berg, 2005).
In addition to the analysis of sanction e®ects on job characteristics, our paper
makes three other major contributions to the literature (for convenience, we refer
to these as contributions 2, 3 and 4). To understand the importance of two of
these, we should start by pointing out two special features of the Swedish UI
monitoring system. First, the monitoring of an unemployed individual is carried
out by the same case worker who also provides job search assistance to the indi-
vidual. This case worker is the only person who can take the initiative to give a
2sanction. This is a marked di®erence with monitoring in other countries, which
is typically carried out by agencies that are distinct from the agencies providing
job search assistance to the unemployed. Secondly, after in°ow into UI, monitor-
ing focuses on job o®er decisions, in the sense that unemployed individuals are
not supposed to reject suitable job o®ers. This is also in contrast to monitoring
in other countries, which typically focuses on search e®ort, as measured by the
number of applications sent out or indicators of the willingness to adhere to job
search guidelines.
The second major contribution of the paper is that we study a policy change
in the monitoring system during the period under observation. Before February
5, 2001, the only possible punishment rate was a rate of 100% (i.e., complete
UI bene¯ts withdrawal) for a certain amount of time. After that, the default
rate was 25%. The underlying motivation for this change was that the personal
connection between the case worker and the person he/she was supposed to help
made it di±cult for the former to propose a punishment that amounted to the
full withdrawal of the latter's income. It was felt that more modest sanctions
would increase the threat e®ect of sanctions and thereby would increase the exit
rate to work for those not (yet) punished. The decision to change the punishment
rate was made and announced only shortly before the implementation date. In
theory, this provides a \regression discontinuity" that the analyst may use to
identify the threat e®ect of a monitoring system. With our population-level data,
we aim to pursue this. We examine changes in sanction rates and the exit rate
out of unemployment before and after the policy change.
The estimation results and di®erences with estimates in the literature can be
understood by resorting to a job search theoretical model framework. The third
major contribution of the paper is that we develop and analyze a theoretical
model with monitoring of job o®er decisions in the presence of wage variation. The
theoretical predictions can be contrasted to those from a model with monitoring
of job search e®ort or search intensity. We ¯nd some qualitative di®erences, and
these by itself contribute to our understanding of e±cient policy. Notice that
monitoring of o®er decisions increases the relevance of studying e®ects on job
quality, because rejected o®ers typically concern jobs with a low job quality.
The fourth major contribution is methodological. \Timing of events" mod-
els are usually estimated with random samples from the in°ow into the state
of interest, by maximum likelihood. However, in the case of a rare treatment,
the random sample needs to include many individuals in order to obtain a suf-
¯cient number of individuals who are observed to be treated. Estimation with
very large samples is computationally demanding. We therefore propose to esti-
3mate the models with endogenously strati¯ed samples, using weighted exogenous
sampling maximum likelihood (WESML). Accordingly, the sample we use con-
tains all individuals observed to get a sanction, plus a subsample of the other
individuals. This estimation method has not yet been used in the context of
bivariate dependent-duration models (see Ridder, 1986, and Amemiya and Yu,
2006, for applications to univariate duration analyses with endogenously strati-
¯ed samples). The method requires certain aggregate population statistics, but
recall that we observe the complete population of Sweden.
The main empirical result of the paper is that, on average, sanctions cause in-
dividuals to accept jobs with a lower hourly wage and less working hours per week.
The estimated average reduction in the accepted wage is almost 4%. In addition,
sanctions causally increase the likelihood of the acceptance of a job at a lower
occupational level, incurring a permanent human capital loss that is on average
equivalent to at least some weeks of formal education. The theoretical analysis
suggests that these adverse e®ects can be partly (but not fully) prevented if the
system of job-o®er-decision monitoring is replaced by a system of search-e®ort
monitoring. The combination of the theoretical analysis and the data analysis
suggest that the current Swedish system does not exert substantial \ex ante" or
threat e®ects of monitoring on the job exit rate of not-yet punished unemployed
individuals. It is plausible that a system of search-e®ort monitoring that is not
carried out by the case worker who provides job search assistance would actually
create a larger threat e®ect. Methodologically, our paper suggests that WESML
with an endogenously strati¯ed sample containing all treated is a very useful
method for the estimation of causal e®ects of rare endogenous events on dura-
tion outcomes, if one has access to a large data set and population statistics. In
particular, it is very useful for the estimation of dynamically assigned treatments
on duration outcomes if treatments are rare and one has population-level register
data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional set-
ting. It discusses the Swedish UI system and the role of monitoring and sanctions
in that system. It also describes the monitoring policy reforms in our observation
window. Section 3 provides the theoretical job search framework and derives the-
oretical predictions. Section 4 gives a detailed description of the data. In Section
5 we discuss the empirical approach and the WESML estimation method. Section
6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
42 Unemployment insurance
2.1 Unemployment insurance entitlement
This subsection describes the relevant features of the UI system on January 1,
2001. In Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 we discuss the monitoring system and the cor-
responding policy change in 2001. For a detailed description of other UI reforms
during our observation window see Olli Segendorf (2003) and Bennmarker, Car-
ling and Holmlund (2007). These are mostly reforms in local features of the
function from the labor market history to the UI level.
An unemployed (part-time or full-time) individual in Sweden is entitled to UI
bene¯ts if a range of conditions are ful¯lled. First, the individual must have been
member of an unemployment insurance fund for at least 12 months and should
have had a job for at least six months in the past 12 months. Secondly, he needs
to be registered at the public employment service (PES) and has to be able and
willing to work at least three hours a day and at least 17 hours per week. Further,
he must state that he is actively searching for employment.
Those who ful¯ll these conditions are entitled to wage-related UI bene¯ts.
These amount to 80% of the average earnings during the latest six months of
employment, with a °oor and a ceiling. In the beginning of 2001 these were SEK
270 (¼ e25) and SEK 580 a day (¼ e55) per day. Individuals who have not been
a member of an UI fund for at least 12 months may qualify for the Unemployment
Assistance (UA) system. Compensation in UA is unrelated to previous earnings
and the generosity of UA is much lower than UI. In our analysis we restrict
attention to UI recipients. To retain UI during a spell of unemployment, the
individual needs to remain eligible.
In 2001, the entitlement duration of UI bene¯ts was 300 days for everyone.
The bene¯ts could either be collected continuously or with breaks in between the
collection periods. If the individual ¯nds a job and retains it for six months then
he quali¯es for new entitlement period. The individual also continues to collect
UI bene¯ts while being enrolled in a speci¯c labor market program (the activity
guarantee).1 UI bene¯ts are mainly ¯nanced by proportional pay-roll taxes.
1Case workers assess the need for program participation if individuals are close to the end of
their entitlement period. If such need is found then the individual is assigned to the \activity
guarantee" which includes di®erent monitoring activities.
52.2 Monitoring and sanctions
The monitoring of an unemployed individual is carried out by the case worker
of the PES o±ce. This is the same person as the case worker who provides job
search assistance to the individual. The case worker's identity usually does not
change during the unemployment spell.
The case worker is supposed to examine whether the individual's job search
behavior is in accordance to the UI guidelines. This concerns the veri¯cation that
the individual has not rejected suitable job o®ers. The case worker is the only
person who can take the initiative to give a sanction. A sanction is a bene¯ts
reduction for a limited time as a punishment for violation of the guidelines.2 The
case worker is also supposed to verify during the course of an unemployment spell
that the unemployed individual does not violate the UI entitlement conditions
in the ¯rst place. This concerns, for example, unreported employment. If the
individual is deemed non-eligible then he is not registered anymore as being
unemployed. Moreover, his UI bene¯ts payment is terminated immediately and
for an inde¯nite period of time.3
The assignment of a sanction involves a number of stages. First, the case
worker at the PES o±ce observes an infringement. The employment o±ce then
prepares a report to the unemployment insurance fund, stating the infringement
but not yet the sort of sanction it thinks is suitable. The unemployed individual
is informed about the report and is given the opportunity to comment on his be-
havior. In practice, case workers may contact the unemployed individual before
preparing the report, to prevent that the apparent infringement was due to a mis-
understanding. A copy of the report is sent to the central public unemployment
o±ce (AMS).4 In the third stage, a decision about the sanction is made by the
unemployment insurance fund, and a motivation is provided. In 86%, the PES
report results in approval of a sanction by the board; see IAF (2007). In a fourth
stage, there may be an appeal to revert the decision. About 10% of all decisions
2In addition to this, UI bene¯ts can be reduced if the individual has left employment without
a valid reason or due to improper behavior at the work °oor. UI is then suspended for a
maximum of 45 days. We do not analyze this type of temporary bene¯ts reduction because our
data do not allow for a distinction between causal e®ects and selection e®ects of treatments
that start at the beginning of a spell.
3In addition, eligibility is terminated if the individual sabotages cooperation with the em-
ployment o±ce, for example by refusing participate in an individualized \action plan" which is
a pathway back to work with possibly active labor market program participation. In accordance
with the de¯nition of unemployment, we regard such eligibility losses as exits from the state of
unemployment.
4Nowadays, the inspection of the unemployment insurance (IAF) rather than AMS receives
a copy.
6are asked to be reverted, but in only about 20% of these is the decision partly
or fully reversed. Subsequently, one may appeal against a sanction at the county
administrative court (LÄ ansrÄ atten).
There are several unpredictable events in this process. The case workers do
not always observe that an unemployed has turned down a job o®er. Whether
a report is written or not depends on the attitude of the case worker (Swedish
overviews, like IAF, 2006, state that case workers report themselves that there are
di®erences in interpretation of the regulations between counties and employment
o±ces and between individual case workers working at the same employment
o±ce). The bene¯t sanction decision may also depend on the board members
attending the UI fund meeting. All this makes it unlikely that UI claimants
anticipate the imposition of the sanction with great accuracy.
Before the reform of February 5, 2001, the only available sanction was a 100%
reduction of the bene¯ts level for a period of 10 to 60 days. The choice of the
length of the sanction period was supposed to take the (subjectively assessed)
expected remaining duration of unemployment into account. In practice, however,
only a period of 60 days was used.
As noted in Section 1, the Swedish monitoring system was (and is) notably
di®erent from the systems in many other countries (see Grubb, 2000, for details
about the systems in other countries). First, monitoring and job search assistance
are carried out by the same case worker. In other countries, monitoring is typically
carried out by agencies that are distinct from the agencies providing job search
assistance. Secondly, after in°ow into UI, monitoring mainly restricts attention to
job o®er rejections. Other countries focus primarily on search e®ort, as captured
by the number of applications sent out or indicators of the willingness to adhere
to job search guidelines.
Accordingly, Sweden is an outlier in aggregate statistics of sanctions. First, the
number of sanctions issued is very low. Figure 1 displays this number per month,
between January 1999 and November 2004. In 2000, about 3000 sanctions were
issued, on an average stock of 210,000 full-time unemployed UI recipients. In Gray
(2003)'s ranking of countries by sanction occurrence (which, roughly speaking, is
de¯ned as number of sanctions divided by the number of unemployed), Sweden is
the lowest among the nine European countries considered (Sweden 0.79, Germany
1.14, Belgium 4.2, Denmark 4.3, Finland 10.2, United Kingdom 10.3, Norway
10.8, Czech Republic 14.7, Switzerland 40.3). Figures in other OECD countries
are typically much higher than the Swedish ¯gure as well. Abbring, Van den Berg
and Van Ours (2005) report that around 3% of the in°ow of UI recipients receive
a sanction during the UI spell, in The Netherlands in 1993. Contrary to Sweden,
7a number of these countries, including Germany, The Netherlands, and Denmark,
has witnessed strong increases in the occurrence of sanctions since the early 2000s
(see e.g. Svarer, 2007, and Schneider, 2008). We shall argue below that the low
Swedish sanction occurrence can be explained by institutional di®erences in the
monitoring system.
2.3 Policy change of the monitoring regime
The uniquely low occurrence of sanctions in Sweden can be explained by a low
e®ective level of monitoring. In the late 1990s it was felt that the magnitude
of the punishment (100% UI bene¯ts reductions for 60 days) was too large in
the eyes of the case workers. After all, the case worker is primarily trying to
help the unemployed individual, and the former would ¯nd it morally di±cult
to punish the latter harshly. This could prevent case workers from reporting
violations. At the time, many other countries have policies where sanctions are
smaller than 100% of the UI level. Accordingly, the Swedish government changed
the policy design on February 5, 2001 (see e.g. Government of Sweden, 2000, for
a substantiation of the above-given description of the motivation for the policy
reform). From that day onwards, UI is reduced by 25% for 40 days for ¯rst-
time o®enders, and by 50% for 40 days second-time o®enders. A third violation
during the same UI entitlement period entails a full loss of bene¯ts until new
employment has been found. The decision to change the monitoring policy was
made on December 21, 2000, which is 1.5 month before enforcement. The public
employment o±ce AMS arranged regional meetings to inform the case workers
about the policy change. These were held between the middle of February, 2001,
and April, 2001. Case workers complained that after these meetings certain details
of the new policy regime were still not clear to them (personal communications).
Despite the policy change, the occurrence of sanctions has remained very low
by international standards. In Subsection 4.3 we examine whether the occurrence
of sanctions in our individual data registers displays di®erences before and after
the implementation date.
83 Theoretical insights
3.1 A job search model with monitoring of job o®er deci-
sions
In this subsection we present a job search model with monitoring of job o®er
decisions. This model takes distinguishing features of the Swedish UI monitoring
system into account and has not been analyzed in the literature. It is a model
of optimal behavior of unemployed individuals given the presence of a particular
system in which sanctions can be imposed. The model helps to understand the
e®ects of such a system on individual behavior. It also provides insights into the
determinants of the rates at which jobs are found and sanctions are imposed and
the relationships between these rates.
Our point of departure is a basic job search model with a ¯xed individual
search intensity. Consider an unemployed individual who searches sequentially
for a job. Job o®ers arrive according to the rate ¸. Jobs are heterogeneous in
their characteristics. For expositional convenience we take the wage as the only
possible job characteristic in this subsection. O®ers are random drawings from a
wage o®er distribution F(w). Every time an o®er arrives the decision has to be
made whether to accept it or to reject it and search further. Once a job is accepted
it will be held forever at the same wage. During unemployment, a °ow of bene¯ts
b is received, possibly including a non-pecuniary utility of being unemployed. The
individual aims at maximization of the expected present value of income over an
in¯nite horizon.
It is well known that in this model, under some regularity conditions, the
optimal strategy of unemployed individuals can be characterized by a reservation
wage Á, giving the minimal acceptable wage o®er. The transition rate to work
equals ¸(1 ¡ F(Á)).
Now let us introduce monitoring in this model framework. We assume that
the case worker samples a fraction p of rejected job o®ers, and that on average
a fraction q of these rejected o®ers are deemed to be su±ciently suitable for the
unemployed worker. Then a fraction pq of the rejected o®ers should not have
been rejected. Accordingly, the sanction rate equals ¸F(Á)pq. If p = 1 then all
o®ers are monitored, and if p = q = 1 then each rejected o®er entails a sanction.
For a given p and q, we assume that the individual does not know which rejected
o®ers are sampled or which are deemed acceptable by the case worker, but that
he does know the values of p and q.
Some individuals will be more willing to take the risk of being given a sanc-
9tion than others, e.g. because they have a higher non-pecuniary utility of being
unemployed. Obviously, if p = q = 1 and the punishment is su±ciently severe in
comparison to a job with the lowest possible wage, then all job o®ers are always
accepted, and sanctions would never be given. To proceed, we need to be spe-
ci¯c about what occurs after the imposition of a sanction. First of all, bene¯ts
(b) are reduced substantially. Secondly, p is likely to increase. If the individual
again violates the rules concerning job o®er decisions, and this is observed by the
case worker, then additional bene¯ts reductions are imposed. We assume that the
punishment for additional violations is so severe that the individual will avoid
this at all cost, so we assume that all o®ers are accepted after imposition of a
sanction. This implies that sanctions are imposed at most once in a given spell
of unemployment. (A strategy in which individuals take a job upon imposition of
a sanction, and quit immediately in order to make a \fresh start" in UI, would
not be optimal: UI would be reduced again immediately after quitting because
of \insu±cient e®ort to prevent job loss"; see Section 2.)
For simplicity, we assume that the parameters b1 (being the bene¯ts level be-
fore a sanction is imposed), F;¸;p;q and the discount rate ½ are constant as a
function of unemployment duration. Upon imposition of a sanction, b is perma-
nently reduced from b1 to b2, with b2 constant as a function of unemployment
duration. As a consequence, both within the time interval before a sanction and
within the time interval after a sanction, the optimal strategy is constant over
time.
Let R1 and R2 denote the expected present value of income before and after
imposition of a sanction, respectively, and let Á1 denote the reservation wage
before the sanction. We obtain





; (1 ¡ pq)R1 + pqR2g ¡ R1
¸
(1)







with Á1 = (1 ¡ pq)½R1 + pq½R2
Equation (1) can be understood by interpreting R1 as an asset for which the
return °ow equals the °ow of what one expects to gain from holding the asset.
The latter consists of two parts: (i) the °ow of bene¯ts, (ii) the job o®er arrival
rate times the expected gain of ¯nding an acceptable job over staying unemployed.
The second part is the mean over F of the gain corresponding to a wage o®er w.
10If one accepts w then the associated present value is w=½, so the gain is w=½¡R1.
If one rejects it then there is a probability pq that one is caught, in which case the
associated present value is R2, and a probability 1 ¡ pq that one is not caught,
with present value R1. The gain is again equal to the new present value minus
R1. The derivation of (2) is analogous. Equations (1) and (2) can also be derived
as Bellman equations from ¯rst principles.
Notice that with the strictest possible monitoring, i.e., p = q = 1, the outside
option when considering an o®er is equal to a certain punishment, so then Á1 =
½R2. This implies that extreme monitoring does not necessarily entail the absence
of punishments. With certain model parameter values, it may still be optimal for
an individual to prefer a sanction and a forced future job o®er acceptance over
a current low o®er. This is particularly likely if the o®er under consideration is
much lower than the average o®er, and if the punishment b2 ¡ b1 is small.
It is also interesting to consider the expected present value b R1 and optimal
reservation wage b Á1 in the absence of a monitoring system,
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which has a similar structure as the reservation wage equation in a standard job
search model. Clearly, the latter is obtained by imposing p = q = 0. For general
p;q, we obtain a weighted average of the reservation wage in a market without
monitoring, and the present value °ow after having been punished.
Using obvious notation, the transition rates from unemployment to employ-
ment before and after imposition of a sanction equal
µu;1 = ¸(1 ¡ F(Á1)) and µu;2 = ¸ (4)
For a system with given p and q, the probability that a sanction occurs before
a job exit is equal to ¸pqF(Á1)=(¸pqF(Á1) + ¸(1 ¡ F(Á1))) = pqF(Á1)=(1 ¡ (1 ¡
pq)F(Á1)). This can be seen by noting that a newly unemployed individual faces
competing risks (a sanction and job exit) with constant rates ¸pqF(Á1) and µu;1,
respectively. The proportionate e®ect of the sanction on the job exit rate equals
11µu;2=µu;1 = 1=(1¡F(Á1)). This correspond to a parameter of the empirical model.
The additive e®ect of a sanction on the mean accepted wage equals EF(w) ¡
EF(wjw > Á1). The empirical model contains a parameter that captures the
additive e®ect on the mean log accepted wage EF(logw)¡EF(logwjw > Á1). Of
course the empirical parameters are not constrained to have a particular sign,
and they may themselves depend on deeper determinants and characteristics of
the individual and the labor market.
The additive e®ect on the job exit rate equals µu;2 ¡ µu;1 = ¸F(Á1). Notice
that this is bounded from above by ¸.
3.2 Theoretical predictions
A number of insights follow from the model. Consider the general case where the
model parameters are such that Á1 > w: the reservation wage before a sanction is
imposed exceeds the lowest possible wage o®er in the market. This is a necessary
condition to observe sanctions at all. It is clear that b R1 > R1 > R2, and conse-
quently b Á1 > Á1. From the point of view of the individual, monitoring reduces
the expected present value, and so does an actual punishment in a world with
monitoring. By implication, µu;1 < µu;2, and both are larger than the transition
rate in a world without monitoring.
Consequently, monitoring a®ects the transition rate of all individuals (except
for those who have a very low reservation wage b Á1 anyway). This is the ex ante
e®ect of the monitoring system, as opposed to the ex post e®ect due to imposition
of a sanction.
Notice that if Á1 · w then the individual probability of job acceptance is
equal to one, so there will not be any sanctions. If the case worker is very lenient
(q = 0) then the sanction rate is zero as well. Conversely, we have seen that in the
strictest possible monitoring system (p = q = 1), an individual may still prefer
to reject a low-wage o®er in favor of a sanction. This re°ects a ¯rst fundamental
di®erence with monitoring schemes that target an endogenously chosen level of
search e®ort by the individual (see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours, 2005, for
a theoretical analysis). In the latter scheme, perfect monitoring leads to absence of
sanctions, even if the punitive bene¯ts reduction is small. This is because perfect
search e®ort monitoring is instantaneous and continuous in time and the e®ort
constraint will be strictly enforced after a violation. Perfect monitoring of o®ers
only takes place after o®er rejections, and a rejection followed by a sanction may
be worthwhile if it is followed by a high wage o®er at a later point in time.
It is interesting to consider the ex post e®ect and the occurrence of sanctions
12for di®erent subgroups of individuals. First, consider individuals for whom F(Á)
is very small. Since Á1 := (1 ¡ pq)½R1 + pq½R2, it follows that their expected
present value of unemployment after rejection of an o®er is low. At the same
time, they are unlikely to reject an o®er and therefore unlikely to get a sanction.
These may be individuals with a low R1 due to a low job o®er arrival rate ¸ and
low bene¯ts b1. Their sanction e®ect is small as well. Notice that for moderate
values of F(Á1), the probability pqF(Á1)=(1 ¡ (1 ¡ pq)F(Á1)) that a sanction
occurs before a job exit can still be extremely small if q is very small. In that
case the sanction e®ect is not necessarily extremely small.
Secondly, consider the opposite case where F(Á) is large (i.e., close to one).
This may capture long-term unemployed individuals who enjoy generous bene¯ts
b1 whereas their skills have become obsolete and most o®ers that are made to
them concern low-skill jobs with wages below b1 (see Ljungqvist and Sargent,
1997, for an equilibrium analysis). Such individuals have a very high sanction
rate and sanction e®ect. But now let us consider what happens if individuals
can optimally choose their search e®ort s as well. Let the job o®er arrival rate
now be speci¯ed as ¸s, and let the search cost °ow c(s) be a convex increasing
function of s with c(0) = c0(0) = 0, so that the instantaneous income °ow before
a sanction equals b1 ¡c(s). The optimal value of s before a sanction follows from








(w ¡ Á1)dF(w) ¡ ¸pq(R1 ¡ R2)g
If Á1 is at the upper bound of the support of F, then the integral in the above
expression vanishes, implying that s = 0. The same result holds for values of
Á1 close to the upper bound. If the monitoring regime is stringent then the last
term on the right-hand side increases, so the reduction of optimal search e®ort
is exacerbated. In sum, when these individuals can choose their level of search
e®ort, then o®er decision monitoring will be counteracted by a reduction of search
e®ort. To put it bluntly, monitoring of o®er decisions causes individuals with high
bene¯ts (or a high utility °ow of being unemployed) to prevent that they will ever
get an o®er. The ex ante e®ect of monitoring is then perverse: more monitoring
implies a lower job exit rate. We view this as a potentially important insight.
Whereas job search e®ort monitoring always generates a positive ex ante e®ect,
job o®er decision monitoring does not.
We brie°y mention two other di®erences between job search e®ort monitoring
13and job o®er decision monitoring. These concern outcomes after the sanction.
Recall that we assume perfect monitoring after the sanction. The ¯rst of the
two di®erences concerns the magnitude of the ex post e®ect on the job exit rate.
Suppose that search e®ort s is endogenously determined. In the case of job o®er
decision monitoring, the job exit rate after a sanction equals µu;2 = ¸s2, where s2
is the optimal search e®ort after a sanction. Conversely, in the case of search e®ort
monitoring, this rate equals ¸s¤(1 ¡ F(Á2)), where Á2 is the optimal reservation
wage after a sanction and s¤ is the minimum required search e®ort as postulated
by the UI agency. In the latter case, by choosing an appropriately high s¤, the job
exit rate, and by implication the ex post sanction e®ect, can be pushed upwards
to arbitrarily high values. In the former case this is not possible. Intuitively, the
e®ect of job o®er monitoring is bounded from above by the rate at which job o®ers
arrive. (Of course, by pushing up s¤¤ in search e®ort monitoring, the privately
incurred search costs c(s) increase at an even higher speed. Also, if s¤ becomes
very large then the distribution of the associated wage o®ers may change at the
margin.)
The fourth and ¯nal di®erence between the monitoring regimes was already
mentioned in the introduction of the paper, namely that the adverse e®ects of
sanctions on post-unemployment outcomes may be smaller with search e®ort
monitoring than with job o®er decision monitoring. Perfect monitoring after a
sanction implies full compliance after the sanction. With job o®er decision mon-
itoring, this means that compared to the situation before a sanction, punished
individuals now also have to accept all o®ers of jobs with the lowest wages. With
search e®ort monitoring, however, full compliance means that punished individu-
als have to search harder for any possible job. The latter includes both high-wage
jobs and low-wage jobs.
All results in this section generalize to non-wage job characteristics. Basically,
if the individual's utility °ow function depends on the wage and on other char-
acteristics then the role of the income °ow variables in the present section is
replaced by the corresponding utility °ows.
We ¯nish this section by brie°y mentioning some implications of the above
that are of importance for the speci¯cation of the empirical model. The empir-
ical model is a reduced-form model in which hazard rates are allowed to vary
over time and across observed and unobserved individual characteristics. The
implications below also follow from models with monitoring of an endogenously
determined search e®ort (see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours, 2005). First,
at the individual level, the transition rate from unemployment to employment
makes a discrete upward jump upon imposition of a sanction. If individuals are
14homogeneous then the size of this jump, which is the causal e®ect of the sanction
treatment, can be estimated from an unemployment duration model in which the
moment at which a sanction occurs is a time-varying exogenous covariate.
Empirical analyses of duration data from a market with a given monitoring
system do not allow for non-parametric identi¯cation of ex ante e®ects. So such
analyses cannot be used to evaluate the e®ect of the monitoring system on unem-
ployment durations. The latter objective requires at least some observed variation
in the monitoring system itself.
Both the transition rate from unemployment to employment and the rate
at which a sanction arrives depend on all the variables that the individual uses
to determine his strategy. This is because both depend on Á1 (provided that
Á1 > w). In reality, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to determinants
of search behavior. Suppose that the individuals know their own value of some
characteristic but that these values are not observed in the data. As we argued
in Section 1, with punitive treatments, such a setting is plausible. Then both
the transition rate from unemployment to employment and the rate at which
a sanction is imposed depend on this unobserved characteristic. This creates
a spurious relation between the duration until a sanction is imposed and the
duration of unemployment. Note that a similar spurious relation is created if the
policy parameters p and q of the sanction rate itself di®er across individuals in a
way that is not observed by the researcher.
4 Data
4.1 Data registers
Our main data are taken from a combination of two Swedish register data sets
called HÄ andel (from the o±cial employment o±ces) and ASTAT (from the un-
employment insurance fund). HÄ andel covers all registered unemployed persons.5
It contains day-by-day information on the unemployment status, whether the
unemployed is covered by UI, entries into and exits from active labor market pro-
grams and part-time unemployment, and the reason for the unemployment spell
to end. As a rule, UI spells end in transitions into re-employment, education,
social assistance, or other insurance schemes. HÄ andel also includes a number of
background characteristics, recorded at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
ASTAT provides information on all bene¯ts sanctions, including information on
5According to Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001), more than 90% of the individuals who
are ILO-unemployed according to labor force surveys also register at the employment o±ces.
15the timing of the sanction, the main reason for the sanction, and the size of the
bene¯t reduction.
Our observation window runs from January 1, 1999 until December 31, 2003.
We only use information on individuals who become unemployed at least once
within the observation window. An individual becomes unemployed at the ¯rst
date at which he registers at the employment o±ce as being "openly" unem-
ployed. We ignore unemployment spells that are already in progress at the be-
ginning of the observation window, because using them would force us to make
assumptions about the period before the beginning of the window. We focus
on re-employment durations, and consider any employment, full-time or part-
time, which is retained for at least 10 days as employment. At later stages we
separately model the decision to accept part-time employment. UI spells that ter-
minate for other reasons than re-employment are considered being right-censored
re-employment durations. We stop time while unemployed are enrolled into active
labor market programs. Robustness analysis shows that our results are insensitive
to this restriction. Apart from that, individuals are only followed up to December
2004. Ongoing spells at that date are right-censored. We restrict our analysis to
everyone who was between 25-55 at the time of entry into unemployment and
covered by UI.6 We only model the ¯rst sanction during an unemployment spell.
Any e®ects of a second or third sanction are considered to be a part of the ¯rst
sanction treatment e®ect. Finally, we exclude all unemployment spells for a spe-
ci¯c individual that occur after a spell during which a sanction was given to that
individual. This is because we exploit multiple spells to enhance the quality of
the results, and we cannot rule out that a sanction also a®ects future subsequent
spells.
The sanction and unemployment data are combined with survey data on wages
and hours worked from Statistics Sweden's wage statistics. It provides us with
information on actual wages per time unit, so these are not wages created from
annual earnings and some measurement of hours worked. The wage is recorded as
the monthly full-time equivalent wage. The survey is collected annually (during
the fall) by Statistics Sweden in cooperation with employer organizations. It
covers the whole public sector, all large private ¯rms and a random sample of
small ¯rms (about 50 percent of all private sector employees). If we observe a
wage within one year after the exit to employment we use this wage, otherwise
the wage is considered to be missing. The information on hours worked is used
6We also exclude disabled individuals and everyone who some time during the research
period participated in sheltered employment, because these are intended for unemployed with
some kind of disability or handicap.
16to construct an indicator variable for full-time employment, de¯ned as working
34 hours or more a week.
The wage data also include individual occupations. These are classi¯ed us-
ing SSYK 96 (Standard fÄ or svensk yrkesklassi¯cering 1996), which follows the
international standard ISCO-88. Each occupation is classi¯ed into 355 separate
groups of occupations (four digits). The ¯rst digit classi¯es occupations by the
general quali¯cations required to perform the tasks associated with each occu-
pation. It divides the occupations into four levels: the occupations in group 1
normally require no or limited education, level 2 occupations require high school
competence, level 3 occupations short university education, and the occupations
at level 4 require longer university education (3-4 years or more). Additional digits
capture the specialization skills associated with each occupation. We matched oc-
cupations to individual education levels taken from Statistics Sweden's database
\Louise".
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides statistics on the unemployment spells and the duration until a
sanction. In Subsection 5.4 below we explain that we choose to estimate models
with an endogenously strati¯ed sample. The current subsection provides infor-
mation on the full data set and on the sample used for the model estimation.
A large part, 65.7%, of the re-employment spells in our analysis data set is not
right-censored. Remember that the remaining 34.3% of the spells are ongoing at
the end of the data period, or UI spells that are completed for other reasons
than re-employment. During only 0.18% of the unemployment spells in our full
sample a sanction is imposed, compared with 8.4% in the data set used for the
model estimation. Relatively many sanctions, 46.7%, are imposed during the ¯rst
100 days of unemployment. There is also a substantial number of sanctions, 16%,
imposed after 300 days or more in unemployment. Because of censoring, these
raw ¯gures underestimate the incidence of sanctions and the duration at which
these are imposed. About 8% of the sanctions are given to second-time o®enders
and only about 0.5% to third-time o®enders.
Table 2 provides statistics on the job-quality measures. For about 35% of the
spells for which observe an exit to employment we observe the wage within one
year after the exit. Not observing the wage can be due to fact that the individual
is employed in small private ¯rms or due to fact that the individual already
left employment before the time of the survey. As the wage survey is conducted
annually, the mean time from the exit to employment to the time of the wage
17survey is about half a year (179 days). Note that, because the survey is mainly
conducted during the fall and because there is seasonal variation in exits from
unemployment, the time from the exit to the survey is not uniformly distributed
over 1-12 months. The mean monthly wage is about SEK 17,840 among the
individuals for whom we observe the wage, and about 57% of these individuals
have full-time employment. Furthermore, 57% ¯nd a job in the public sector, 31%
in a large private ¯rm, and 21% ¯nd a job in a small private ¯rm. Here, a large
¯rm is de¯ned as having 200 employees or more.
The missing wage data may not be missing at random. First of all, remember
that we observe the wage for all public sector employees, all employees at large
private ¯rms, and a random sample of those working in small ¯rms. Suppose that
individuals who are sanctioned accept lower wages on average. Small ¯rms tend
to pay lower wages than large ¯rms, so there may be a selectivity in the wage
observations, and this may lead to an under-estimation in absolute values of the
negative e®ect of sanctions on wages. To explore this, we specify a logit model
for the choice between accepting public sector or private sector employment, and,
given the choice to enter the private sector, a logit model for the choice between
accepting employment in a large ¯rm or a small. In both models we control for
a number of covariates, such as sex, age, level of education, time of in°ow into
unemployment, regional variables, level of education, the kind of profession the
unemployed is searching for and whether the unemployed has education respec-
tively previous experience in that occupation. We estimate these two logit models
jointly using maximum likelihood, and the results are presented in Table 3. The
results show no evidence of selection due to a sanction into small private ¯rms.
We therefore feel con¯dent in assuming that it is random whether we observe the
wage or not. The same holds for hours worked.
The second concern regards the fact that, in most cases, some time elapses
between the exit from unemployment and the wage survey. It means that we do
not observe the ¯rst wage after unemployment for individuals who have quickly
moved into a second or even third employment. We neither observe the wage for
those who have become unemployed or left the labor market entirely before the
wage survey is conducted. Both these factors may bias our job quality estimates. If
there is an e®ect of a sanction on the job security, relatively more individuals with
sanctions will go back into unemployment before the time of the wage survey. As
these individuals can be expected to be on the lower end of the wage distribution
it will also bias our job quality estimates upwards. In addition, if unemployed
with sanctions move relatively faster into a second employment, with a higher
wage, it will also bias our job quality estimates upwards. To proceed ahead, even
18with these potential biases we ¯nd signi¯cant negative job quality e®ects.
4.3 Around the date of the monitoring policy regime change
In this subsection we provide descriptive statistics on the occurrence of sanctions
shortly before and after the policy change of February 5, 2001. Ideally, a change
in the monitoring regime o®ers an opportunity to investigate the ex ante threat
e®ect.
As apparent from Figure 1, the reform did not lead to a substantial increase
in the number of sanctions issued. Instead, apart from seasonal °uctuations, this
number has been increasing slowly and steadily after the reform.
In addition, there are large regional di®erences in the development of the
number of sanctions over time. Regional variation is to some extent due to the
fact that only the individual case worker and the chief of the local PES o±ce
decide about whether a report should be sent to the unemployment insurance
fund (recall the statements in IAF, 2006 mentioned in Subsection 2.2). Table 13
lists the mean number of sanctions per quarter by region. In Figure 2 and Figure
3 we display an index of the quarterly number of sanctions for each of the years
2000-2004 using the quarters of 1999 as base period. An index value of 2 in 2003
means that sanctions are twice as frequent in 2003 as in the same quarter in
1999. We display this for three regions in the southern and the central parts of
Sweden, respectively. They reveal a wide regional variation in patterns after 2000.
We observe permanently increased sanction numbers in some regions, no change
in some other regions, and temporary increases in sanctions in yet other regions.
To focus more closely on the moment of the policy change, we list in Table 13
the ratio between sanction occurrences in the ¯rst quarter of 2001 and the ¯rst
quarter of 2000, and the same for the other quarters in 2001 and 2000. These
ratios are purged from seasonal variation. The statistics con¯rm the patterns in
Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Clearly, from a methodological point of view, it is hard to reconcile the erratic
and region-speci¯c °uctuations in the occurrence of sanctions after the policy
change to the idea of exploiting the discontinuity in the monitoring system for
the estimation of ex ante e®ects. But at the very least we may conclude that the
occurrence of sanctions has not increased substantially after the policy change.
According to our theoretical model, there are two possible explanations for this.
First, the case workers have decided to not to act on policy change but instead
to continue not to recommend sanctions in case of violations, because they ¯nd a
25% bene¯ts reduction still too severe. Obviously, in the new system, the punish-
19ments are less harsh than before, but from an international perspective they are
still substantial. In the Netherlands, where sanctions are less severe, and monitor-
ing is carried out by di®erent individuals than the case workers, the individuals
who carry out the monitoring state that they are less likely to issue a sanction if
they feel that the unemployed individual faces adverse labor market conditions
(see Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). In agreement to this, studies
with Dutch data ¯nd that individual characteristics that are associated with a
low exit rate to work are also associated with a low sanction rate, con¯rming
that the monitoring intensity depends positively on the individual's labor market
conditions. In terms of our theoretical model, this ¯rst explanation would mean
that the policy change does not lead to any changes in the parameters in the
decision problem for the unemployed individual.
The second explanation for the low occurrence of sanctions after the policy
change is that a more stringent monitoring scheme may motivate many individu-
als to avoid violations at all costs, i.e. that the policy change induced a strong ex
ante e®ect. The net e®ect of an increase in the monitoring and a decrease in vio-
lations may then be that the occurrence of sanctions remains low. In terms of our
theoretical model, the policy change is captured by an increase of q which leads
to a decrease of Á1 such that virtually all o®ers are accepted. In Subsection 3.2 we
also showed that an increase of q may lead to a reduction of search e®ort to zero,
such that no o®ers are generated in the ¯rst place, and consequently sanctions do
not occur. However, this is potentially only relevant for a subset of individuals
whose bene¯ts are high compared to the wages they may earn. Obviously, a zero
e®ort gives rise to extremely long unemployment spells. (A third explanation is
that monitoring was virtually perfect in both regimes, but this seems borne out
by the motivation for the policy change as well as by the variation in enforcement
across case workers.)
To distinguish between these explanations we have to examine the unem-
ployment duration outcomes and the post-unemployment outcomes. The ¯rst
explanation implies that the job exit rate µu;1 is the same in both regimes. The
second explanation implies that this rate changes after the policy change. This
is because in the ¯rst case Á1 does not change whereas in the second case it de-
creases. The identi¯cation of a subgroup of individuals with zero search e®ort in
the new regime seems to be beyond what is empirically feasible, but we should
keep in mind that such a subgroup may exist. We return to the issues of this
subsection after having presented the duration model estimates in Section 6.
205 Empirical model
5.1 Timing of Events model
This section presents our empirical model. In Subsection 5.1, we present a basic
bivariate duration model, for the duration until employment and the duration
until the imposition of a sanction. This \timing of events" approach (Abbring
and Van den Berg, 2003) is the standard approach in the literature on sanction
e®ects. In Subsection 5.2 we extend this well known model into our full model,
incorporating the job quality into the same model.
We normalize the point of time at which the individual enters unemployment
to zero. We are interested in investigating how the duration ts until the imposition
of a sanction a®ect the duration until employment, te. In order to illustrate the
basic identi¯cation problem, suppose that we observe that the individuals who
are sanctioned at ts have relatively short unemployment durations then this can
be for two reasons: (1) the individual causal sanction e®ect is positive, or (2) these
individuals have relatively favorable unobserved characteristics and would have
found a job relatively fast anyway. The second relation is a spurious selection
e®ect. To control for such spurious e®ects, we analyze both the distribution of
te for a given ts and the distribution of ts jointly. It is well known that these
distributions can be conveniently represented by the corresponding hazard rates.
First, consider individuals who are unemployed for t units of time. We assume
that all individual di®erences in the re-employment rate at t can be characterized
by observed characteristics x, unobserved characteristics Ve, and a sanction e®ect
if a sanction has been imposed before t. Next, consider the rate at which a sanc-
tion is imposed on an unemployed individual. Similarly as for the re-employment
hazard, we assume that all individual di®erences in this rate can be character-
ized by observed characteristics x and unobserved characteristics Vs. We further
assume that the re-employment rate denoted by µe(tjx;Ve;ts), and the sanction
rate denoted by µs(tjx;Vs) both have the familiar Mixed Proportional Hazard
(MPH) speci¯cation, this gives
µe(tjx;Ve;ts) = ¸e(t) exp(x
0¯e) exp(I(t > ts)±(tjts;x)) Ve; (5)
µs(tjx;Vs) = ¸s(t) exp(x
0¯s) Vs: (6)
Here I(:) is an indicator function taking the value one if the argument is true
and zero otherwise. ±(tjts;x) then represent the sanction e®ect, which we allow to
vary both with observed characteristics and with time, t¡ts, since the imposition
21of a sanction. Further, ¸e(t) and ¸s(t) represents the duration dependence in the
re-employment hazard and the sanction hazard, respectively.
Equations (5) and (6) give the joint distribution of te;tsjx;Ve;Vs. Our data
provide information on the distribution of te;tsjx. Let G denote the joint distribu-
tion of Ve;Vsjx in the in°ow into unemployment. It is clear that a speci¯cation of
G, together with the speci¯cation of the joint distribution of te;tsjx;Ve;Vs, fully
determines the distribution of te;tsjx, and thus the data. Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003) show that all components of this model, including ±, are identi¯ed,
provided we make assumptions similar to those usually made in standard uni-
variate MPH models with exogenous regressors. Identi¯cation is semi-parametric
in the sense that given the MPH structure, it does not require any parametric
assumptions on the components of the model. It allows for general dependence
between te and ts through both the causal e®ect of sanctions and related unob-
servables.
The identi¯cation does not require conditional independence assumptions or
exclusion restrictions on the e®ects of x on the individual hazard rates µe and µs.
This is important, since all variables that a®ect the sanction rate plausibly also
a®ect the re-employment rate, and vice versa. Instead, identi¯cation is based on
the timing of events, i.e. the timing of sanctions and of exits out of unemployment.
Intuitively, what drives the identi¯cation of the sanction e®ect, ±, is the extent to
which the moments of a sanction and the moment of exit to employment are close
in time. If a sanction is quickly followed by exit to employment, no matter how
long the elapsed unemployment duration before the sanction, then this is evidence
of a causal e®ect of a sanction. Any spurious selection e®ects through dependence
between Vs and Ve, gives a second relation between the two duration variables,
but it can be shown that that relation does not give rise to the same type of
quick succession of events. So the interaction between the moment of exit and
the moment of a sanction in the conditional rate of events allows one to distinguish
between the causal e®ect and selectivity. The Monte Carlo simulations in Gaure,
R¿ed and Zhang (2007) support the use of this approach by showing that the
estimates of the parameters of interest are robust with respect to functional form
assumptions.
Formally, identi¯cation of the model relies on a number of implicit and ex-
plicit assumptions. We assume that a sanction does not a®ect the re-employment
rate before the moment of the sanction, whereas the e®ects of the unobserved
covariates are ¯xed during the spell. The former is often referred to as the no-
anticipation assumption. With sanctions, the moment at which an individual is
caught is almost by de¯nition unanticipated by the individual. As explained in
22Section 2 there are also several sources of unpredictability in the sanction process,
which makes it even less likely that UI claimants anticipate the actual timing of
the sanction. Next, since we speci¯ed the hazard rate it means that we implicitly
assumed that there is a random component in the assignments that is indepen-
dent of all other variables. Based on the randomness in the sanction process
and the obvious randomness in the job-search process, we are con¯dent that this
assumption is satis¯ed.
Identi¯cation with single-spell data also requires that (i) x on the one hand
and Vu, Vs on the other hand are independent in the in°ow, and (ii) there is
su±cient variation in x. However, since we often observe multiple UI spells for a
given individual we can relax these two assumptions. We assume that multiple
spells for one individual given the characteristics are statistically independent of
each other, that the unobservables Vu and Vs are ¯xed across spells, and that
the length of intervening spells between any two unemployment spells of a single
individual are independent of Vu and Vs. As shown by Abbring and Van den Berg
(2003), under these assumptions, the assumptions (i) and (ii) can be discarded.
5.2 Extension to post-unemployment outcomes
We measure job quality by the monthly wage, and by whether the accepted job is
full-time or part-time. These outcomes can be expected to depend on unobserved
factors that are related to the unobserved determinants of the job exit rate and
the sanction hazard. For instance, ability plays an important role for all these
outcomes. In order to identify the e®ects of a sanction on the job quality we need
to impose some structure. We assume that the causal e®ect and the selection
e®ect only a®ect the mean log wage, and we assume that these e®ects are additive.
Speci¯cally, the wage at the start of the new employment can be expressed as
lnw = x
0¯w + °wI(ts < te) + Vw + ew; (7)
where °w is the sanction e®ect, Vw unobserved individual characteristics, and ew
is an error term which re°ects random variation in the hourly wage. ew is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2
w. Similarly, we specify
the decision to accept full-time employment as
h = 1[x
0¯h + °hI(ts < te) + Vh + eh > 0] (8)
23where h = 1 if the individual ¯nds full-time employment. As before °h is the
sanction e®ect, Vh unobserved individual characteristics, and eh an error term
which re°ects truly random variation. eh is assumed to have a standard logistic
distribution.
We also acknowledge the tight link between the unobserved e®ects in the two
job quality measures and the unobserved e®ects in the sanction hazard and the
exit hazard. We take a simple linear form for this relation, as
Vw = ¯weVe + ¯wsVs; (9)
and
Vu = ¯heVe + ¯hsVs: (10)
Here ¯we,¯ws, ¯he, and ¯hs captures the correlation between the unobservables in
the model.
Abstracting from censoring, the joint density of Te;Ts;W;Hjx at Te = te;Ts =







































exp(x0¯h + °hI(te > ts) + ¯heve + ¯hsvs)
1 + exp(x0¯h + °hI(te > ts) + ¯heve + ¯hsvs)
G(ve;vs) (11)
We jointly estimate this full model.
Consider identi¯cation of this full model. In short the duration part of the
model identi¯es G, and given this we can estimate ¯we,¯ws, ¯he, and ¯hs. We have
then uncovered the selection process in the job quality decisions. It allows us to
integrate out the unobserved e®ects in the wage equation and the hours worked
equation.
245.3 Parameterizations
Given the assumptions discussed above, including the MPH structure, the model
is identi¯ed without any further parametric restrictions. However from a com-
putational point of view we need to specify some parametric structure. We take
°exible speci¯cations of both the duration dependence functions and the bivari-







Note that with a large number of polynomials any duration dependence pattern
can be approximated closely. In the basic analysis we take polynomials of seventh
order and lower for the exit hazard, and polynomials of third order and lower for
the exit hazard. We have experimented with both more and less polynomials.
The results are insensitive such changes, unless the number of polynomials are
very few.
We use a bivariate discrete distribution with unrestricted mass point locations
for G. This provides a very °exible speci¯cation as well as being computationally
feasible. In our basic speci¯cation we take Ve and Vs to have two points of sup-













with 0 · pi · 1 for i = 1;::;4, and p4 = 1 ¡ p1 ¡ p2 ¡ p3.
5.4 Weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood
estimation
Our full data set contains over 1.6 million unemployment spells of about 827,000
individuals. In only about 3000 of these spells a sanction is imposed. To keep
the empirical analysis manageable from a computational point of view and at
the same time have enough spell with sanctions, we use weighted exogenous sam-
pling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimation with an endogenously strati¯ed
sample. This method has not been used yet in the context of bivariate dependent-
duration models, and is not widely used in labor economics in general (see Ridder
and Mo±tt, 2007, for a detailed econometric overview).
25With exogenous sampling, a sequence of individuals is sampled and their out-
comes and characteristics are recorded. In contrast, with endogenous sampling, a
sequence of outcomes are sampled and the characteristics of the individuals with
these outcomes are recorded. Endogenous strati¯ed sampling has, for instance,
been used in transportation economics (see e.g. Manski and Lerman, 1979, and
Garrow and Koppelman, 2004) and in biostatistics. A key example is the study
of rare diseases, for which it is reasonable to over-sample individuals with rare
disease.
In our case we wish to use all information on the individuals who receive a
sanction. We therefore sample all individuals who experience at least one sanc-
tion in the observation window, and take a smaller random sample (14,000) of
individuals who do not experience a sanction during this window. For these in-
dividuals, both sanctioned and non-sanctioned, we take all unemployment spells
during the research period, leaving us with about 35,000 spells.
As shown by Manski and Lerman (1977), WESML provides a consistent es-
timator. Each observation is weighted with the ratio between the population
fraction and the sample fraction of the strata it belongs to. De¯ne Li as individ-
ual i's contribution to the likelihood function. Then, formally, WESML amounts










where d(s) is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual i experience
outcome s, Q(s) the actual fraction of the population selecting alternative s, and
H(s) the probability that an individual selecting alternative s is included in the
sample. In our case, we have two alternatives: s = 1 if the individual experiences
a sanction during the research period, and s = 0 otherwise.
Inference on precision also has to be adjusted. Manski and Lerman (1977)
show that the appropriate covariance matrix is the familiar sandwich estimator

















The WESML estimates are not e±cient. E±cient estimators based on endoge-
nously strati¯ed samples are developed in Imbens and Lancaster (1996). The basic
idea is to use the populations moments as moment restrictions in order to improve
26e±ciency. We decide not to pursue this approach. The reason for this is that our
analysis sample will be large, and e±ciency is not a crucial issue. Furthermore,
in our case the most e±cient estimator is to use the full sample of 1.6 million
unemployment spells and estimate using standard ML.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
This subsection presents the baseline estimation results for the Timing of Events
model, with a sanction e®ect that is constant over the population and over time.
In the next subsection, we investigate the importance of temporal and cross-
sectional variation in ±. From Subsection 6.3 and onwards we present the results
from our full model, testing whether a sanction a®ects the quality of the accepted
employment.
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the basic model. In this estimation
we use the analysis sample presented in Section 4, and estimate the model using
WESML. We use the individual characteristics listed in Table 2, and a set of
in°ow time dummies as observed covariates. As we will not normalize the scale
of the unobservables, we have to exclude a constant from the regressors and one
category from each set of dummies.7 We further normalize the two constants in
the duration dependence, ®s0 = ®e0 = 1.
The parameter of interest is the sanction e®ect ±. The estimate of ± is positive
and signi¯cant at the 1% level. The estimate indicates that a sanction increases
the transition rate to employment with about 23%. Compared to other studies
on UI sanctions e®ects on the job exit rate this is a rather small e®ect. For the
Netherlands, Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (2005) ¯nd that a sanction
doubles the job exit rate. For Switzerland, Lalive, Van Ours and ZweimÄ uller
(2005) estimate that the job exit rate increases with about 25% if a sanction
warning is issued and with another 25% if a sanction is actually imposed. For
Denmark, Svarer (2007) estimates increases of about 50% for men and a doubling
for women. We can only speculate about the reasons behind these di®erences.
Presumably, the institutional settings play a role. As described in Section 3.2,
a system of job-o®er decision monitoring, like the system in Sweden, places a
natural upper bound on the sanction e®ect, because even if all o®ers are accepted,
7Our base category consists of women, with neither education nor experience in their occu-
pation, who do not need guidance, living in the central parts of Sweden, with less than high
school education and who started their unemployment spell in 1999.
27the job exit rate is bounded from above by the job o®er arrival rate. A system
where a minimum search e®ort is imposed after a sanction does not give rise to
such an upper bound. Moreover, after a sanction, unemployed workers in Sweden
may reduce their e®ort to zero in order to prevent further job o®ers and therefore
additional punishments.
The signs of the regressor e®ects on both hazards are mostly as expected.
Not surprisingly, we ¯nd selection on observables. For example, the dummy for
individuals with university education generates a negative selection e®ect: highly
educated unemployed have high re-employment rates and low sanction rates.
Omitting this dummy as an explanatory variable would have resulted in under-
estimation of ± (if it is not captured by the unobservables). Further as expected,
is the re-employment rate higher for highly educated, and for unemployed which
have education in their profession. The e®ect of the observables on the sanction
rate also reveals some interesting patterns. The gender dummy is insigni¯cant,
indicating that discrimination is not important for the sanction decision. We also
note that the sanction e®ect is signi¯cantly lower among older workers.
Table 4 also reports the estimates for the baseline hazard as a set of coe±cients
for the polynomials of order one to seven. In order to provide more intuition be-
hind these estimates we have produced two ¯gures: Figure 4 and Figure 5, which
display the estimated duration dependence at daily basis for the exit rate and
sanction rate, respectively. Remember that the baseline hazard at time point zero
is normalized to one. The exit rates to employment initially decrease, but after
about 150 days of unemployment the exit rate starts to go down. For instance,
after 600 days in unemployment the re-employment rate is about 30% lower com-
pared with at the start of the unemployment period. Apparently, stigmatization
and discouragement play a signi¯cant role for individual unemployment dura-
tions. The sanction rate gradually rises with time spent in unemployment. After
about 300 days the maximum sanction rate is attained, and at longer durations
there is a tendency towards decreased sanction rate. This is consistent with the
fact that sanctions that are imposed because of some violation during the unem-
ployment spell cannot be given at the start of that spell.
6.2 E®ect heterogeneity
We now allow the sanction e®ect to vary over the population. We ¯rst specify ±
as a function of explanatory variables x, as follows: ± = x0°, for some parameter
vector ° that replaces the single e®ect parameter ±. Since our sample only con-
tains a limited number of sanctions, we only include a small number of variables.
28We test for heterogeneous e®ects by sex, age, level of education, local unemploy-
ment rate, type of sanction regime and local sanction volume. Table 5 presents
the estimated sanction e®ects. The other estimates are very similar as for the
basic model, and are therefore not reported. We ¯nd interesting heterogeneous
treatment e®ects: the sanction e®ect is signi¯cantly lower for males, and signi¯-
cantly lower for older unemployed. There is further no di®erence in the sanction
e®ect by level of education, nor by local unemployment rate. We also included
the regional occurrence of sanctions (number of sanctions divided by the number
of unemployed), interacted with the treatment. If stigma is an important part of
the sanction e®ect, the sanction e®ect should be lower in regions where sanctions
are more common. However, we ¯nd no such di®erences.
Next, consider how the monitoring regime a®ects the sanction e®ect. As ex-
plained in Section 2 the Swedish sanction regime was changed in February, 2001.
The reform introduced new, softer, sanctions, which reduced the size of the ben-
e¯t reduction from 100% to 25%. The new sanctions may in°uence the average
sanction e®ect in two ways. First, the new sanctions are softer so that we expect
the sanction e®ect to decrease for each individual. Second, the reform increased
the sanction volume, implying that unemployed who commits less serious viola-
tions are also sanctioned after the reform. These individuals are most likely more
sensitive to sanctions, which gives an upward tendency in the average sanction
e®ect. The e®ect of the reform on the average sanction e®ect is therefore theoret-
ically ambiguous. We ¯nd that the average sanction e®ect is signi¯cantly higher
under the new sanction regime. We draw two conclusions from this result: (i) un-
employed who commits less serious violations are more responsive to sanctions,
and (ii) the new softer sanctions are also considered as a severe punishment.
It is also possible that sanctions have an e®ect only shortly after they have
been imposed. To investigate this we introduce duration dependence in the e®ect
parameter, as follows: exp(±) = exp(±1+±2(t¡ts)). If ±2 is negative this means that
the sanction e®ect decreases over time. Table 6 reports the estimates of ±1 and
±2. These results indicate very persistent e®ects of a sanction. We have multiplied
the coe±cient for ±2 with 100. It means that the average sanction e®ect on the
re-employment hazard after 100 days is about 19%, compared to 20% directly
after the sanction has been imposed. There are several potential explanations
to this persistent e®ect. It is reasonable to believe that individuals who have
experienced a sanction are subject to intensi¯ed monitoring and attention from
the case workers. In addition, second time o®enders are punished harder, so that
the persistent e®ect may be an e®ect of that the unemployed is eager to avoid
future sanctions.
296.3 Job quality
We now consider the e®ect of a sanction on characteristics of the subsequent
employment. From a welfare point of view, as well from the point of view of the
unemployed individual, any such e®ects are important. If the job accepted after
a sanction is similar to the job accepted in the counterfactual situation of no
sanction, then severe sanctions and intensive monitoring have less adverse e®ects
than otherwise.
Table 7 presents the estimates of the full model. The parameters of interest
are ±w and ±h, the sanction e®ect on the wage and hours worked, respectively. Our
estimates show a negative and signi¯cant (at 1% level) sanction e®ect on both the
wage and on hours worked. A sanction decreases the accepted wage with about
3.8%. We measure hours worked using an indicator variable taking the value
one for full-time employment and zero otherwise. Recalculated into marginal
e®ects the results in Table 7 imply that a sanction increases the probability to
accept part-time work with about 10.3 percentage points, or 15 percent. Part-time
work is more often associated with a less secure employment, and of course, a
lower income. We therefore interpret the e®ect on hours worked as a re-enforced
negative e®ect on the job quality. It means that a sanction has a quite large
negative impact on quality of the subsequent job.
The signs of the regressor e®ects on both the wage and hours worked are
as expected. Males receive higher wages compared to women. Unemployed with
high school education earn about 2% more than unemployed with less than high
school education. The corresponding number for unemployed with university edu-
cation is 11%. We ¯nd similar patterns for hours worked. Males, highly educated,
and unemployed in low employment areas, tend to ¯nd full-time employment
to a higher degree. This con¯rms that wage and full-time employment both are
perceived as attractive job characteristics.
6.4 Long run e®ects
It may be that the sanction e®ect on the accepted job is a short-term e®ect,
and that those who su®er a sanction catch up quickly, say after two or three
years. This would be in line with the results in Zijl, Van den Berg and Heyma
(2009), who ¯nd that temporary jobs often serve as a stepping-stone into regular
work. On the other hand it may also be the case that those who su®er a sanction
end up on a lower job quality trajectory, with long-term or even permanent job
quality e®ects. Obviously, if there are long run e®ect the negative welfare e®ects
of sanctions are smaller. Investigating the long run e®ects is thus crucial from a
30policy perspective.
In order to investigate the long run e®ects of a sanction we re-estimate our
full model using the wage and full-time status after two, three and four years in-
stead of the wage and full-time status directly after the exit from unemployment.
We use the same full model as speci¯ed in Subsection 5.2, including a normally
distributed wage, a logit speci¯cation for the full-time part-time decision, and
a °exible speci¯cation of the observed and unobserved e®ects in the model. Ta-
ble 9 presents some descriptive statistics for these long run outcomes. Obviously,
we cannot observe the wage for those who have left the labor market and not
for those who once again are unemployed. As expected we therefore observe less
and less wages as time passes on after the exit to employment. It means that
we estimate these models with some reservations. However, as the wage several
years after the exit from unemployment is rarely observed, we ¯nd this exercise
meaningful.
Table 10 presents our long-term job quality estimation results. Here we only
present the sanction e®ects, but remember that the models also include the du-
ration until a sanction, as well as extensive controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. We ¯nd that sanctions have very persistent job quality e®ects. Our
previous results indicated that a sanction decreases the wage directly after the
exit from unemployment with 3.8 percent. Here, we ¯nd that this wage e®ect is
3.4, 4.3 and 4.7 after two, three and four years after the exit from unemployment,
respectively. We ¯nd similar long run e®ects for hours worked: a sanction has neg-
ative and signi¯cant e®ect on the probability to get full-time employment. We
conclude that those who get a sanction do not catch up quickly. From a welfare
perspective this is an important result.
6.5 Occupational changes
One can separate out two main explanations for a long run e®ect. It could either
be an e®ect of the unemployed; (i) accepting a job with a lower occupational level,
or (ii) accepting a less well paid job within the same occupation. From a policy
perspective, separating between these two explanations is important. If a sanction
forces individuals to switch into a less quali¯ed occupation, it imply that these
individuals are not able to utilize all their education and experience. It means
that on average, acceptance of a job with a lower occupational level involves a
larger loss of human capital than acceptance of a job in the same occupation.
This loss becomes irreversible as human capital depreciates over time. It may
therefore be more di±cult for the individual to move out of a bad job match if
31the job has a lower occupational level. This makes it important to know whether
sanctions often lead to a match in a lower occupational level.
We use two di®erent approaches to test whether a sanction means that the
unemployed accepts a job with a lower occupational level. In both approaches we
utilize the occupation codes in our wage survey data. In the ¯rst approach we use
the four o±cial quali¯cation levels. They are based on the "objective" quali¯ca-
tions required to perform each work, and not necessarily on the quali¯cations the
individuals working in each occupation actually have. As described in Section 4,
the di®erent occupations are divided into four groups: occupations that require
no or limited education, high school competence, short university education, and
longer university education (3-4 years or more), respectively. It allows us to rank
each occupation from one to four. In the second approach we use register data
on the number of years of schooling on every individual in Sweden to classify
the occupations. Using this education data and the entire wage survey for 2001,
we calculate the mean number of years of schooling among the individuals em-
ployed in each occupation. It provides a measure of the quali¯cation level of each
occupation. We perform this classi¯cation at three di®erent levels: dividing the
occupations at one, two and three digit level, respectively.
In order to control for observed and unobserved e®ects we specify similar
models as our regular full model. For the ¯rst approach we specify an ordered
logit model for the four quali¯cation levels. For the second approach specify a
linear model for the mean number of years of schooling for each occupation,
and assume that the error term is normally distributed. In order to control for
selection on unobserved e®ect we allow for correlation between the unobservables
in model. We take Vq = ¯qeVe + ¯qsVs, where Vq is unobserved characteristics
in the occupation classi¯cation measure, and ¯qe and ¯qs as for the regular full
model measure the correlation between the unobservables in the model.
Table 11 provides descriptive statistics for the occupation data. We show
information for the 8 groups at the one digit level.8 Column 1 and 2 show the
proportion of unemployed entering into each occupation for our sample and the
full sample, respectively. Column 3 reports the o±cial quali¯cation level obtained
from SSYK for each group. These are the quali¯cation levels used in the ¯rst
approach. From these classi¯cations it is clear that the occupations are primarily
distinguished by the education normally required to perform the work associated
with each occupation. Column 4 presents the mean number of years of schooling
for the individuals employed in each group. Note that the di®erence between these
8We have excluded work in the armed forces and managerial work. The reason for this is
that they are not classi¯ed into the four quali¯cation levels in SSYK.
32groups is quite small. One reason for this is the existence of separate educational
tracks.
Table 12 presents the estimation results: the upper panel displays the results
from ¯rst approach and the lower panel from the second approach. For brevity,
we only report the sanction e®ects. All models indicate a negative e®ect of a
sanction on the quali¯cation level. The e®ect is, however, not signi¯cant in the
¯rst approach model. Most likely, this is because these groups are very broadly
de¯ned. For the second approach, which utilizes the mean years of schooling to
classify the occupations, we ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects. A sanction means that the un-
employed tend to accept employment within occupations that on average require
0.036-0.047 less years of schooling. In other words, unemployed who experience a
sanction on average switch into a slightly less quali¯ed occupation, resulting in
a loss of human capital. Because of the existence of separate educational tracks,
this is likely to be a lower bound of the true loss.
6.6 An assessment of the design of the monitoring policy
In Subsection 4.3 we postulated two explanations for the fact that there was no
persistent dramatic increase in the occurrence of sanctions after the monitoring
policy change. It would be a formidable computational task to estimate a duration
model with regime indicators, because the latter are time-varying over the course
of a given spell of unemployment. Moreover, as we have seen, there is no uniform
moment in time when observed outcomes jump to another level and remain stable
afterwards. The occurrence of sanctions displays substantial region-speci¯c °uc-
tuations in the year after the policy change. For these reasons we do not estimate
a before/after model. However, note that the calendar time indicators for the in-
°ow moment do not display a signi¯cant di®erence when comparing 2000 to 2001.
Because of this, the ¯rst-mentioned explanation is the most likely explanation:
the policy change was ine®ective due to the fact that case workers shun away
from issuing sanctions more frequently. This interpretation is consistent with the
facts that case workers have substantial discretionary power to implement policy
guidelines, and that their primary task is to help the unemployed to ¯nd a job.
In a way, their discretionary power is used to the maximum extent, through the
rareness of punishment issuance.
As a result, across our observation window, the monitoring regime does not
exert a strong ex ante or threat e®ect. This means that the ex post e®ects capture
the causal e®ects of a sanction as compared to the outcomes in a labor market
without monitoring (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2005).
33One could replace the current Swedish system by a system in which (i) moni-
toring focuses on job search e®ort instead of job o®er decisions, and (ii) monitor-
ing is carried out by di®erent individuals than the case worker who provides job
search assistance. It is plausible that this would lead to a threat e®ect on the exit
rate to work before punishment and as such would lead to a reduction of unem-
ployment. This is both because with (ii) the moral dilemmas that the case workers
currently face are avoided, and because with (i) they cannot avoid sanctions by
reducing their search e®ort to zero. Moreover, in such an alternative system one
may expect less adverse e®ects of sanctions on post-unemployment labor market
outcomes than in a system where (i) is not satis¯ed, like in the current sys-
tem. Our empirical results show strongly adverse e®ects on post-unemployment
outcomes in the current system. Assuming perfect monitoring after a realized
punishment, the system with monitoring of job o®er decisions entails that pun-
ished individuals now have to accept the jobs they like least, whereas the other
system entails that punished individuals have to search harder for any possible
job. The jobs they like least are the jobs with a low job quality. If the e®ects on
post-unemployment outcomes are adverse in a system with monitoring of o®er
decisions then they are also adverse in the other system, because in both systems,
the sanction involves a negative income e®ect. However, the theoretical results
imply that the size of these adverse e®ects is larger in the former system than in
the latter.
7 Conclusions
We ¯nd that sanctions have adverse e®ects on post-unemployment outcomes. On
average, they cause individuals to accept jobs with a lower hourly wage and less
working hours per week. The estimated average reduction in the accepted wage
is almost 4%. The probability to move into full-time employment decreases with
about 15%. What is more, we provide evidence that post-unemployment outcomes
are also a®ected in the long run. Sanctions causally increase the likelihood of the
acceptance of a job at a lower occupational level. Such decisions are to some
extent irreversible, in which case they involve a permanent human capital loss.
From a present-value point of view, this means that sanctions entail a substantial
welfare loss for at least some individuals.
Concerning the e®ects of sanctions on the transition rate into work, we ¯nd
a signi¯cant positive e®ect. On average, this involves a 23% increase. Compared
to estimates for the job exit rate in other studies, this is a rather small e®ect. At
the same time, the Swedish UI sanction rate is much smaller than in most OECD
34countries.
We explain our ¯ndings by additional and novel empirical and theoretical
analyses, and we combine the evidence in order to assess the current Swedish
monitoring system. First, our empirical examination of the monitoring policy
change in our observation window leads us to conclude that case workers use
their substantial discretionary power to keep sanction rates low because they feel
uncomfortable initiating punishments to their clients. This ¯nding shows how
di±cult it is to implement monitoring policies if those who carry out the day-
to-day monitoring have discretionary power and have personal contacts to the
individuals to whom they are supposed to issue punishments. In our case, the
¯ndings implies that across our observation window, the monitoring regime does
not exert a strong ex ante (or \threat") e®ect.
Secondly, our theoretical analysis derives implications of the fact that Swedish
monitoring is primarily focused on the prevention of job o®er rejections. Such
a policy has particularly adverse e®ects on post-unemployment outcomes. Its
emphasis on the acceptance of all job o®ers means that individuals are pushed
to modify their behavior towards the acceptance of low-quality jobs. In addition,
this policy induces some individuals to reduce their search e®ort to zero in order
to prevent receiving any job o®ers at all. The ex ante e®ect of monitoring is then
perverse for some individuals, with more monitoring implying a lower job exit
rate. We view this as a potentially important insight. The theoretical analysis is
also able to explain also explain why the ex post e®ect on the job exit rate is not
very large. The system of job o®er decision monitoring places a natural upper
bound on the sanction e®ect, because even if all o®ers are accepted, the job exit
rate is bounded from above by the job o®er arrival rate. And, after a sanction,
unemployed workers may reduce their e®ort to zero in order to prevent further
job o®ers and therefore additional punishments.
We contrast the job o®er decision monitoring system to the alternative and
more common system of job search e®ort monitoring. The adverse e®ects of sanc-
tions on post-unemployment outcomes may be smaller with search e®ort moni-
toring, because it pushes individuals to search harder for any possible job and not
just the jobs with low quality. Moreover, search e®ort monitoring is not compat-
ible with the perverse ex ante e®ect mentioned above, and the ex post e®ect on
the job exit rate is not restricted by the kind of upper bound mentioned above.
All this suggests that it is worthwhile to consider an alternative system in
which (i) monitoring focuses on job search e®ort instead of job o®er decisions,
and (ii) monitoring is carried out by di®erent individuals than the case worker
who provides job search assistance. Such a system may lead to a larger threat
35e®ect, a larger ex post e®ect on the job exit rate, and a smaller ex post e®ect
on post-unemployment outcomes. Obviously, a larger threat e®ect could lead to
lower unemployment durations for many individuals. It would be interesting to
shed some more light on these issues by studying spatial and temporal variations
in institutions and outcomes in more detail, but the currently low occurrence of
sanctions precludes this avenue. We should also note that in very recent years the
Swedish system has gradually adopted more features of search e®ort monitoring
(OECD, 2007).
It is important to point out that a complete switch to such an alterna-
tive regime cannot be expected to completely rule out adverse e®ects on post-
unemployment outcomes. After all, if those e®ects are adverse in a system with
monitoring of o®er decisions then they will also be adverse in the other system,
because in both systems, the sanction involves a negative income e®ect.
Our paper also makes a major methodological contribution to the estimation
of causal e®ects of rare endogenous events on duration outcomes. We show that
WESML with an endogenously strati¯ed sample containing all treated is a useful
estimation method if one has access to population-level register data. It allows for
a computationally feasible analysis and provides estimates with high precision.
The ¯nding that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level
after a sanction may have implications for the more general issue of how steeply
bene¯ts should decline as a function of the elapsed unemployment duration. The-
oretical studies of optimal UI design do not distinguish between jobs in the same
occupation (with opportunities to mitigate the low starting wage through job-
to-job transitions) and jobs with a lower occupational level (where long-run op-
portunities may be less abundant). Such a distinction may shed a new light on
the optimal balance moral hazard with the likelihood that unemployed individu-
als are driven into sub-optimal job matches. We leave this as a topic for further
research.
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Figure 2: Index over quarterly number of sanctions 2000-2004 for three regions
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41Table 1: Sample statistics for duration in unemployment and duration until a
sanction
Full sample Our sample
Regardless of treatment
No. individuals 827,074 16,941
No. spells 1,665,420 35,055
% with exactly one spell 48.7 49.4
% with exactly two spells 24.2 24.0
% with more than two spells 7.1 7.0
% ts observed 0.18 8.4
% te observed 65.7 65.2
average observed te 104.4 (112.4) 114.5 (122.9)
median observed te 68 74
Concerning spells with sanction observed
No. Spells 2941 2941
% te observed 56.1 56.1
average observed ts 240.2 (174.0) 240.2 (174.0)
median observed ts 193 193
average observed te 140.6 (134.0) 140.6 (134.0)
median observed te 96 96
% ts in
0-50 days 27.1 27.1
50-100 days 19.7 19.7
100-150 days 12.3 12.3
150-200 days 10.6 10.6
200-250 days 7.5 7.5
250-300 days 6.1 6.1
300- days 16.6 16.6
Type of sanctions
% 100% reduction for 60 days 68.0 68.0
% 25% reduction in 40 days 32.0 32.0
Notes: The time unit is day. ts is time until sanction, and te time in unemployment. Standard deviation in
parenthesis. Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample
described in the data section.
42Table 2: Sample statistics for wages and hours worked
Full sample Our sample
Wage data
% exit to employment observed 65.7 65.2
Of which
Observe wage % 36.5 35.1
Observe hours worked % 30.4 29.2
Public sector employment % 55.9 57.2
Private sector ¯rm ¸ 200 workers 31.2 30.4
Private sector ¯rm < 200 workers 21.7 21.0
Monthly wage in SEK 17941 (4371) 17843 (4446)
Full time (¸ 34 hours a week) % 58.7 57.0
Average time between exit and wage survey 179.5 (107.6) 178.9 (108.3)
Median time between exit and wage survey 161 161
Time between exit and wage survey
-60 days 13.7 14.5
61-120 days 22.3 21.8
121-180 days 18.7 19.0
181-240 days 13.7 13.4
241-300 days 14.6 14.0
301- days 17.0 17.4
Individual
Male (%) 50.2 52.2
Education in occupation (%) 64.6 65.5
Experience in occupation (%) 39.6 39.7
Needs Guidance (%) 22.8 23.2
Age 36.4 (8.14) 36.4(8.11)
North (%) 22.1 22.3
Central (%) 37.5 36.9
South (%) 40.4 40.8
Less than high school (%) 20.3 21.3
High school education (%) 54.3 55.3
University education (%) 25.4 23.4







Notes: Wage is the ¯rst observed (within one year) after the exit from unemployment. Time of in°ow is de¯ned
as the calendar year the unemployment spell starts. Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells,
and our sample the selected sample described in the data section. Standard deviations in parentheses.
43Table 3: Logit estimates for the choice between private and public sector employ-
ment and the choice between large and small private ¯rm
Public sector Large private ¯rm
Est. S.e.. Est. S.e.
Sanction e®ect 0.038 0.107 0.067 0.151
Individual
Male -0.996 0.058 0.018 0.082
Education in occupation 0.033 0.063 0.186 0.081
Experience in occupation -0.030 0.063 0.193 0.086
Needs Guidance 0.045 0.068 -0.002 0.091
Log(age) 0.739 0.126 -0.417 0.167
North 0.423 0.082 -0.489 0.113
South 0.040 0.062 -0.178 0.083
High school Education 0.270 0.078 -0.314 0.096
University Education 0.523 0.095 -0.173 0.127
Local unemployment 0.008 0.022 0.064 0.031
In°ow time
2000 -0.098 0.085 -0.001 0.117
2001 -0.057 0.098 0.216 0.133
2002 0.061 0.103 0.334 0.140
2003 -0.250 0.098 0.155 0.132
Searched profession
Administrative and managerial -0.815 0.171 -0.474 0.096
Sales -0.476 0.158 -1.600 0.093
Agricultural, forestry and ¯shing -0.438 0.164 -2.148 0.108
Technical and related -1.426 0.212 -2.110 0.165
Transport and communication -0.741 0.186 -2.028 0.135
Production -0.295 0.149 -2.517 0.096
Service -0.530 0.170 -1.165 0.099
Constant -1.099 0.484 2.051 0.652
No. Observations 8017
Mean of outcome 0.572 0.583
Log Likelihood -11872
Notes: Public sector de¯ned as an indicator variable taking the value one if the unemployed ¯nds employment
in the public sector. Large private ¯rm de¯ned as an indicator variable taking the value of if unemployed ¯nds
employment in a ¯rm with more than 200 employees, given that the unemployed have found private sector
employment. Sample consist of everyone in our analysis sample for which we observe exit to employment and
have information on the type employment within one year after the exit. Estimated using WESML.
44Table 4: Estimates of basic model. Exit hazard and sanction hazard.
Exit Hazard Sanction Hazard
Est. S.e. Est. S.e.
Sanction e®ect,± 0.205 0.035
Unobserved heterogeneity
V 1/V 3 -4.646 0.151 -5.630 5.003
V 2/V 4 -3.362 0.153 -5.860 1.268
Pr(vu = V 1;vs = V 3) 0.005
Pr(vu = V 1;vs = V 4) 0.610
Pr(vu = V 2;vs = V 3) 0.248
Pr(vu = V 2;vs = V 4) 0.136
Individual
Male -0.084 0.017 0.075 0.039
Education in occupation 0.231 0.018 0.069 0.041
Experience in occupation 0.014 0.018 -0.060 0.044
Needs Guidance -0.006 0.019 0.011 0.049
Log Age -0.373 0.039 -0.405 0.088
North 0.232 0.026 -0.099 0.059
South -0.007 0.019 -0.191 0.043
High school Education 0.123 0.021 -0.131 0.047
University Education 0.068 0.026 -0.632 0.062
Local unemployment -0.025 0.007 -0.100 0.017
In°ow time
2000 0.015 0.025 0.165 0.067
2001 -0.045 0.028 0.147 0.074
2002 -0.104 0.030 0.377 0.075
2003 -0.250 0.028 0.500 0.074
Duration dependence
®1 3.674¢10¡3 0.915¢10¡3 7.416¢10¡3 1.505¢10¡3
®2 -19.343¢10¡6 10.010¢10¡6 -12.124¢10¡6 4.077¢10¡6








Notes: Sample is the selected sample described in the data section. Estimated using WESML with robust
standard errors. The omitted category is: living in the central parts of Sweden with less than high school
education. Local unemployment is the regional unemployment in percent at the time of in°ow.






High school Education -0.068 0.069
University Education 0.066 0.085
Local unemployment -0.017 0.021
New system 0.222 0.070




Notes: The model also includes controls for observed and unobserved variables. These
estimates can be obtained from the authors upon request. Sample is the selected sample
described in the data section. Estimated using WESML with robust standard errors.
Local unemployment is the regional unemployment in percent at the time of in°ow.
Regional sanction occurrence is the ratio of the annual number of sanctions in the region
and the annual mean stock of unemployed in the region, times 1000. Measured at the
time of the sanction.
Table 6: Estimates of time-varying sanction e®ect
Exit Hazard
Est. S.e.
General, ±1 0.204 0.043




Notes: ±2 have been multiplied with 100. The model also includes controls for
observed and unobserved variables. These estimates can be obtained from the
authors upon request. Sample is the selected sample described in the data sec-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 9: Sample statistics for long{term wages and hours worked
Full sample Our sample
Exit to employment observed
Of which 65.7 65.2
Observe wage after 1 year 25.7 23.9
Observe wage after 2 years 21.3 19.8
Observe wage after 3 years 16.5 15.2
Monthly wage in SEK after 1 years 19001 (4521) 18952 (4580)
Monthly wage in SEK after 2 years 19616 (4471) 19545 (4493)
Monthly wage in SEK after 3 years 20054 (4409) 19942 (4594)
Full time (¸ 34 hours a week) after 1 year 68.2 67.0
Full time (¸ 34 hours a week) after 2 years 69.5 68.0
Full time (¸ 34 hours a week) after 3 years 69.5 65.9
Notes: Wage after 1 year is the observed wage 1-2 years after the exit, and so on. Full sample is the full sample of
all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample described in the data section. Standard deviation
in parenthesis.
Table 10: Estimates of long-term job quality sanction e®ect
Exit Hazard Wage Hours worked
Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e.
One year after exit 0.136 0.035 -0.034 0.010 -0.709 0.146
Log-Likelihood -167,440
Two years after exit 0.214 0.030 -0.043 0.010 -0.778 0.158
Log-Likelihood -167,336
Three years after exit 0.208 0.034 -0.047 0.017 -0.530 0.197
Log-Likelihood -176,429
Notes: Each panel (one, two and three years) represents di®erent sets of results.
Wage one year after exit is the full-time monthly wage in SEK, and hours worked
an indicator variable taking the value on if it is full-time employment and zero
otherwise, 1-2 years after the exit from unemployment, and so on. Each model
also includes controls for observed and unobserved variables. The corresponding
estimates are available upon request. Sample is the selected sample described in
the data section. Estimated using WESML with robust standard errors.











Professionals 16.9 16.0 4 14.4
Technicians and associate professionals 12.8 12.9 3 13.2
Clerks 8.5 8.5 2 11.7
Service workers and shop sales workers 31.9 33.2 2 11.3
Skilled agricultural workers and ¯shery 2.0 1.9 2 10.6
Craft and related trade workers 10.0 9.4 2 10.9
Plant and machine operators 9.7 10.2 2 11.0
Elementary occupations 8.3 7.9 1 10.5
Exit to employment observed % 65.7 65.2
Of which observe occupation code % 33.6 31.6
Notes: Full sample is the full sample of all unemployment spells, and our sample the selected sample described
in the data section. The division of the occupations are based on Statistics Sweden's SSYK classi¯cation. Two
categories armed forces and managerial occupations are excluded. The quali¯cation level is based on the o±cial
classi¯cation, based on the quali¯cations required to perform the tasks associated with each occupation. Years
of schooling is the mean years of schooling among all employed in the occupation group in 2001.
Table 12: Estimates of sanction e®ect on type of occupation.
Exit Hazard Occupation level.
Est. S.e. Est. S.e.
Four level o±cial classi¯cation
Sanction e®ect 0.136 0.032 -0.030 0.177
Log-Likelihood -182,041
Classi¯cation by years of schooling
Sanction e®ect one digit 0.256 0.030 -0.036 0.016
Log-Likelihood -183,391
Sanction e®ect two digits 0.151 0.029 -0.038 0.020
Log-Likelihood -175,157
Sanction e®ect three digits 0.196 0.028 -0.047 0.026
Log-Likelihood -182,041
Notes: The four panels represents di®erent sets of results. Four level o±cial clas-
si¯cations is a ordered logit speci¯cation for the o±cial SSYK classi¯cation of
the occupations. Classi¯cation by years of schooling classi¯es the occupations
by the mean years of schooling among all employed in that group of occupa-
tions, either at one, two and three digits level. Each model also includes controls
for observed and unobserved variables. These estimates can be obtained from
the authors upon request. Sample is the selected sample described in the data
section. Estimated using WESML with robust standard errors.
50Table 13: Summary statistics for regional occurrence of sanctions.
NS 2001 / NS 2000
1000NS=NU Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Stockholm 1.46 1.12 1.32 1.18 1.19
Uppsala 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.69
SÄ odermanland 0.99 5.60 0.95 0.72 0.21
Ä OstergÄ otland 0.75 0.44 0.64 1.69 0.81
JÄ onkÄ oping 1.10 1.21 1.35 1.74 0.70
Kronoberg 1.12 1.83 1.90 0.63 0.67
Kalmar 1.64 2.40 2.38 1.17 1.69
Blekinge 0.79 0.79 2.89 6.33 3.75
Skº ane 1.12 1.14 1.38 1.39 1.81
Halland 0.67 1.33 0.81 0.90 0.74
VÄ astra GÄ otaland 0.82 0.95 0.86 0.75 0.96
VÄ armland 1.21 1.45 1.41 1.14 0.76
Ä Orebro 1.35 0.41 1.04 1.05 2.23
VÄ astmanland 0.78 1.45 2.11 1.00 0.56
Dalarna 0.72 0.73 1.33 0.52 1.13
GÄ avleborg 0.69 0.57 0.69 1.05 0.72
VÄ asternorrland 0.89 1.33 1.75 1.13 1.56
JÄ amtland 0.97 1.64 1.00 0.40 0.23
VÄ asterbotten 1.16 1.42 0.57 0.83 0.86
Norrbotten 1.07 1.67 1.11 1.11 2.10
Notes: NS is the mean number of sanctions in the region, and NU is the mean stock of full-time unemployed
collecting unemployment insurance bene¯ts in the region. Qi stands for the i'th quarter.
51